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Abstract. one of the most important features of contemporary Western 
societies is the rise of (religious) pluralism. Whereas (philosophical) theism 
used to serve as a common ground to discuss the truth-claims of religion, this 
approach seems to have lost much of its plausibility. What I want to argue in 
this article is that philosophy of religion as a  critical intellectual activity still 
cannot do without the notion of religious truth, but also that it needs to redefine 
this truth in an existential way, i.e. by interpreting religions as concrete ways of 
life. In this paper I develop this idea of religious truth by interpreting religions 
as traditions of wisdom, being a kind of truth that is able to orientate humans’ 
lives without being swayed by the issues of the day. In order to substantiate my 
interpretation I discuss three fundamental aspects of wisdom, viz. the fact that it 
rests on a broadened idea of reason, the way in which it discovers the universal 
in the particular, and the insight that all life-orientations are based on a principle 
that is subjectively adequate, but objectively inadequate (Kant).
I. INTroDuCTIoN
For many philosophers, the rise of (religious) pluralism is one of the most 
important features of contemporary Western society. This phenomenon 
has resulted in an enormous boost of the philosophical interest in 
religious matters, far beyond the traditional disciplinary borders of 
philosophy of religion. but the rise of religious pluralism has in its turn 
changed the agenda of philosophy of religion quite dramatically: in order 
to participate in the current academic and public debate philosophy 
of religion has to give up one of its traditional theorems, viz. that all 
Christian denominations are eventually nothing but the offspring of 
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one and the same natural religion, whose truth can be demonstrated 
unambiguously by human reason. According to Habermas and rawls 
this foundationalist approach of religion belongs to a metaphysical past, 
in particular that of natural or rational theology, and needs to be replaced 
by a  more descriptive approach that departs from religion as a  social 
reality. These authors brand the idea of religious truth as intrinsically 
authoritarian and resulting in oppressing the essential pluralist character 
of modern societies, and hence this idea needs to be replaced by notions 
like an (overlapping) consensus or by a post-metaphysical justification 
of political rule.
However, in my view the notion of religious truth cannot be dismissed 
so easily at all; on the contrary, I  expect it to dominate, often in the 
form of fundamental rights and essential values, the academic debate, 
including that among philosophers of religion, as well as the public 
debate in the years to come. First of all, the notion of religious truth has 
always been fundamental in at least two world religions, Christianity and 
Islam; hence it is very unlikely that their present-day adherents will be 
willing to drop it altogether. Secondly, far beyond the intra-confessional 
disputes about religious orthodoxy, the idea of religious truth is obviously 
at odds with the pluralism of contemporary society. Hence the latter 
cannot escape the question which public expressions of these truths are 
contradicting its own essential values, and which ones are to be tolerated 
or even welcomed as a  contribution to what holds society together. 
Thirdly, although Habermas and rawls reject the idea of religious truth, 
they explicitly recognize that all great religious traditions are treasuries 
of true wisdom, thereby implicitly referring to another dimension of 
religious truth than the authoritarian or oppressive one.
So, in view of these intricate issues I  think that one of the most 
important challenges for philosophy of religion in the years to come 
consists in redefining the notion of religious truth in such a way that it 
makes sense and can be discussed in the context of pluralist democracies. 
Interestingly, the question of the truth-claims of Christian religion 
has been a  shared point of interest between analytical philosophy of 
religion (especially theism) and those continental philosophers, who are 
convinced that these kinds of metaphysical questions rather have to be 
redefined than dismissed altogether. In this paper I  shall first give an 
analysis of the theistic idea of religious truth and explain why it has lost 
a great deal of its plausibility. Thereafter I shall try to redefine religious 
truth as an expression of wisdom, and argue that such an approach may 
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offer a new common ground that is compatible with the pluralism of our 
times. In the course of my paper it will become clear that a redefinition 
of religious truth inevitably implies that philosophy of religion needs to 
take a new direction too.
II. THe loSS oF PlAuSIbIlITY oF THe THeISTIC IDeA 
oF relIGIouS TruTH
In this paper I  use the term ‘theism’ not in its general sense, namely 
the belief in the (Christian) God, but in a much more specific way as 
a philosophical theory about God’s existence and his essential attributes. It 
originated in the 16th century as an intellectual attempt to help put an end 
to the religious controversies that resulted from diverging interpretations 
of Scripture on purely doctrinal grounds. Furthermore theism was 
to serve as a philosophical reply to the rise of atheism and scepticism 
during the renaissance and early enlightenment.1 The central claim of 
theism concerns the existence of God as ‘a person without a body (i.e. 
a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do everything, knows everything, is 
perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the 
creator and sustainer of the universe’.2 These sentences are not to be seen 
as expressing attitudes or commending ways of life, but make ‘claims 
about how things are’.3 Precisely this aspect highlights the philosophical 
and in particular cognitive character of theism, implying that its concept 
of religious truth rather belongs to the domain of natural or rational 
theology than to that of revealed religion. even more so, in a  theistic 
sense the truth or falsehood of the statement ‘I believe in God, Creator 
of heaven and earth’ differs not qualitatively but only in degree from the 
statement ‘I believe it is not going to rain this afternoon’ being true or 
false.4 The basic components of theism are threefold. First it presents 
1 Ingolf Dalferth, ‘The Historical roots of Theism’, in Svend Andersen (ed.), 
Traditional Theism and its Modern Alternatives (Acta Jutlandica lXX:1 Theology Series 
18), (Aarhus: Aarhus university Press, 1994), p. 15. See also: Christoph Schwöbel, ‘After 
“Post-Theism”’, in ibid., pp. 173-178; and Peter Jonkers, ‘religious Truth in a Globalising 
World’, in Philip Quadrio and Carol besseling (eds.), Religion and Politics in the New 
Century: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (Sydney: Sydney university Press, 
2009), pp. 182-189.
2 richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 1.
3 richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, p. 37.
4 Han Adriaanse, ‘After Theism’, in: Svend Andersen (ed.), Traditional Theism and its 
Modern Alternatives, p. 132.
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a  philosophically coherent concept of God, being the true common 
ground of all particular religious confessions, so that this concept can 
bridge the gap between the opposing doctrinal views and convictions of 
the latter.5 Second, the coherence of this concept of God serves as the point 
of departure for demonstrating the existence of God, which is necessary 
for the truth of some further theistic beliefs; in particular that God is the 
unique creator and sustainer of the universe. A  third characteristic of 
theism is its preoccupation with finding a solution to the problem of evil. 
because theism claimed to offer a theoretical explanation of all states of 
affairs in the world, the problem of evil and its solution became a central 
issue as well, which was dealt with by theodicy. It is important to note 
that the solutions offered by theodicy were strictly theoretical, thereby 
showing their fundamental difference from more existential approaches 
of the perennial question of how to deal with evil.6
ever since its origin the project of theism has been confronted with 
criticisms stemming both from philosophy and theology. From the 
perspective of the history of philosophy one can refer to the epistemological 
critique of Hume and Kant, stating that human understanding’s aim to 
know the supersensible only produces (transcendental) illusion. Further-
more there is the critique stemming from contemporary continental 
philosophy, interpreting theism as the apex of onto-theology, i.e. as 
having reduced the discontinuous and contingent history of being to 
an all-encompassing and coherent grand narrative. From a theological 
perspective theism has been accused of negating the unbridgeable gap 
between the concept of God as a philosophical principle and the living 
God of religious traditions, between the truth or falsehood of a cognitive 
principle and the existential commitment of religious people to the truth 
of their faith.
However, in this paper I want to focus on another factor explaining 
the fate of theism in our times, viz. the gradual decline of its plausibility. 
Taking this approach means that I  want to situate theism in a  larger 
social context, in particular the rise of more radical forms of (religious) 
pluralism as well as the so-called expressivist turn. This means that I do 
not agree with those authors who situate theism’s plausibility-loss against 
a still more general background, viz. as an aspect of the decline of religion 
in Western societies, commonly known as the secularisation-process.7 
5 Ingolf Dalferth, The Historical Roots of Theism, pp. 28-31.
6 Christoph Schwöbel, After ‘Post-Theism’, pp. 177-8.
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In my view such a  very general explanation does not hold, since it is 
at odds with the current rise of the enduring importance of religions 
in contemporary society, comprising such divergent phenomena as 
the popularity of fundamentalism in some Islamic and Christian 
communities, the growing influence of non-Christian religious traditions, 
the astonishing popularity of the World Youth Days and the millions of 
people attending the beatification of the late Pope John Paul II. Hence 
the reasons of theism’s loss of plausibility have to be more specific and to 
be found elsewhere.7
The most important feature of theism is its ‘foundationalism’, the idea 
that it rests on the solid foundation of conclusive, rational argumentation, 
and thus sees itself entitled to make universal truth-claims about God 
as the ultimate foundation of the universe. by doing so theism was 
able to transcend what it considered to be the historical contingencies 
of the various confessions and provide them with a  common ground. 
It is important to note that this ground is primarily cosmologically 
orientated. This implies, however, that theism de-contextualises the 
religious idea of God by abstracting from the various practices of faith 
and their socio-historic context: the God of theism does not function 
and does not have to function in the concrete contexts of personal piety 
or communal worship.8
In my view this specific form of foundationalism is responsible for 
theism’s loss of plausibility. by taking a dominantly cosmological approach, 
i.e. by focusing on God as the creator and sustainer of the universe, it 
was able to discuss with the dominant scientific interpretations of the 
cosmos, which were by and large atheistic. but by doing so it has lost out 
of sight so many other, particularly existential aspects of religion that it 
is not considered any more as offering an adequate common ground for 
religious and secular worldviews. First of all theism is, just like modern 
science, a product of modern rationality. In our times however, there is 
a  growing awareness of the reductionist and even oppressive flip-side 
of this type of rationality, and its disenchanting effects upon the lives 
and social environment of people. Secondly, whereas it was one of 
the most fundamental convictions of modernity that reason, with its 
characteristics of unity and universality, was able to contain the rise of 
7 Han Adriaanse, ‘After Theism’, pp. 137-139. Adriaanse refers in this context to the 
influential book of Peter berger, The Sacred Canopy from 1967, re-edited as: Peter berger, 
The Social Reality of Religion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
8 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘After “Post-Theism”’, p. 179.
144 PeTer JoNKerS
pluralism, this belief seems to have dissipated in our times, thus making 
any appeal to a common, reasonable ground a priori suspicious. even 
without going as far as to accept rorty’s radical perspectivism, resulting 
from his rejection of the idea of objective truth as a common ground 
for all ‘final vocabularies’,9 one has at least to admit, with rawls, the 
reality of a  plurality of conflicting and irreconcilable ‘comprehensive 
doctrines’, religious and secular, which are affirmed by reasonable 
people. This leads to the idea of a  reasonable pluralism, which means 
that one has to address all these doctrines as reasonable, even though 
they may be fundamentally different from one’s own. but accepting the 
reality of pluralism implies that a public and shared basis of justification 
that applies to all comprehensive doctrines is lacking in democratic 
society, implying that any judgement as to their truth is doomed to 
fail. Hence, according to rawls one has to accept that ‘the idea of the 
reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of public justification 
for a  constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth’.10 This means 
that rawls still accepts, just like theism, the importance of reasonable 
argumentation as a  common frame of reference for all religions, but 
also that he accepts the dramatic rise of new forms of radical pluralism 
as a  basic characteristic of advanced modernity; consequently, the 
universal truth-claims of theism can no longer be accepted as offering 
the substance of a  common ground. Thirdly, theism’s aim to abstract 
the notion of God from its socio-historical context worked quite well as 
long as the philosophical debate between theists, deists and atheists was 
focused on the cosmological question of the existence of God as creator 
and sustainer of the universe, and on theodicy as a theoretical attempt to 
reconcile the idea of a benevolent God with the existence of evil. but due 
to the affirmation of ordinary life and the expressivist turn (Taylor) the 
focus of the philosophical debate has shifted from a theoretical approach, 
which many people nowadays experience as far-off from their daily lives, 
towards an analysis of the self-involving and existential character of 
religious beliefs.11
All in all, the growing uneasiness with the reductionism of modern 
rationality, the effects of the new rise of radical forms of (religious) 
9 For a more extensive critique of the consequences of rorty’s position for the idea of 
religious truth see: Peter Jonkers, ‘religious Truth in a Globalising World’, pp. 189-197.
10 John rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded edition (New York: Columbia university 
Press, 2005), p. 129.
11 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘After “Post-Theism”’, p. 185.
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pluralism upon the ideas of religious truth and the universality of reason, 
and the shift from a theoretical to an existential approach of religion are 
largely responsible for theism’s loss of plausibility. What implications does 
this have for the future of philosophy of religion? First of all theism is not 
identical with philosophy of religion as such, so that the decline of the 
former does not necessarily mean the end of the latter. on the contrary, 
as I  showed before there is a  growing interest among philosophers, 
including secular ones, in religious issues, especially concerning its role 
in a  public space. Secondly, against all odds and contrary to a wide-
spread (philosophical) conviction, the idea of religious truth, being 
a  fundamental insight of theism, remains very topical. Fundamentally, 
religions, including their truth-claims, discourses, rituals and practices 
must be open to critical interpretation. What has changed since the rise of 
modernity is that this interpretative process is not limited to the members 
of a specific religious community, but also concerns those belonging to 
other religious or secular traditions.12 Whereas theology traditionally has 
taken up responsibility for the first kind of interpretation, a philosophical 
interpretation of religion nowadays has to include the attempt to translate 
it into a language that can be understood by people who are not familiar 
with a specific religious language.13
Philosophy of religion’s focus on a critical interpretation of religions 
implies that the idea of religious truth is still of crucial importance in the 
current debate albeit mostly in an implicit way. However, in comparison 
with the heyday of theism any such attempt has to depart from the reality 
of an insurmountable pluralism instead of abstracting from it; only by 
accepting the fundamental character of this reality can philosophy of 
religion try to re-establish a  common ground for the great variety of 
religious and secular worldviews. Furthermore it has to accept the fact 
that the dominant language of contemporary society has become more 
existential instead of theoretical. obviously this shift influences the way 
in which philosophy of religion approaches its subject: nowadays religion 
is primarily seen as a concrete way of life that is essential for our identity 
in the sense that it gives an answer to fundamental existential questions, 
in other words that it helps to put our lives in perspective. In sum, one 
of the most important challenges for philosophy of religion is to redefine 
12 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘After “Post-Theism”’, p. 186.
13 Interestingly, Habermas, as well as rawls, argues that this translation of religious 
insights into a secular language is essential for their philosophical projects. I refrain from 
commenting on the discussions that have followed their proposals.
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the idea of religious truth in such a way that it takes into account the 
changing cultural context of our times.
III. reDeFINING relIGIouS TruTH AS A Form oF WISDom
redefining (religious) truth within the context of a plurality of existential 
ways of life means first of all that this kind of truth can only be discovered 
through a reflection that is closely connected to these ways of life. It comes 
to the fore through the lives of people for whom expressions like ‘God is 
my Saviour’ and ‘I place my life under the sign of the risen Christ’ really 
orientate their lives. It is important to note that defining religion in such 
a way does not mean that it is something completely contingent, standing 
on the same level as our private funny habits and cultural peculiarities. 
In spite of the inevitable contingency, implied in all religions and secular 
worldviews, it is essential to recognise that they all claim truth and that 
they, in these claims, show major qualitative differences. Hence defining 
religion as a way of life cannot be used as a way to keep off a critical 
examination of its truth-claims; this is all the more true since Christianity 
as well as some other religions and secular worldviews, is essentially 
a religion of conversion.14 Furthermore, especially because the proposed 
approach takes religion not so much as a  theoretical doctrine, but as 
embedded in concrete existence, it is all the more necessary to be aware 
of the fact that every way of life, religious as well as secular, is inevitably 
a mixture of truth and falsehood. but in contrast to the predominantly 
doctrinal approach of theism an existential approach of religious truth 
focuses on notions like truthfulness and faithfulness. Finally, although 
my examples are taken from Christian religion, it is important to note 
that other religions and secular worldviews can also be treasuries of 
existential truth and actually claim to be so.
If one wants to determine the notion of existential truth further, the 
term that is most commonly used is wisdom. In general wisdom can be 
defined as an encompassing, theoretical and practical kind of knowledge, 
which is able to give an orientation or perspective to human existence. 
Wisdom strikes us as an extraordinary kind of knowledge, resting on 
human experience, but also having a divine origin.15 All religions and 
14 For a more detailed analysis of this problem see Peter Jonkers, ‘Contingent religions, 
Contingent Truths?’ in Dirk-martin Grube and Peter Jonkers (ed.), Religions Challenged 
by Contingency: Theological and Philosophical Perspectives to the Problem of Contingency 
(Star-series) (leiden: brill, 2008), pp. 161-181.
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secular worldviews can to a large extent be defined as traditions of wisdom. 
As15to Judaism and Christianity one can refer to the books of Wisdom 
and to the sayings of Jesus; but secular world-views too are treasuries of 
wisdom, and they can be found in the classical works of world-literature 
and conventional wisdom. Hence wisdom can be qualified as having 
a trans-cultural, universally human character,16 which is founded on the 
fact that all humans have to deal with the perennial questions of their 
origin and destiny and want to respond to them in an authentic and 
truthful way. but although this explains that wisdom is indeed universal, 
it does not mean that all that presents itself as such turns out to be true 
wisdom. This is where philosophy comes in, which since Socrates has 
been defined as the quest for wisdom.17 Precisely because it strives for 
true wisdom, it has to examine every pretension of wisdom critically in 
order to liberate it from self-conceit, ideology, etc. The double, divine 
and human origin of wisdom means also that philosophy stands always 
in a relation of approximation with regard to wisdom. Finally, in order 
to be able to fulfil its task philosophy has to approach wisdom in close 
relation to the tempo-spatial context in which people live their lives, and 
not as an abstract kind of knowledge.18
obviously, my proposal to redefine religious truth as wisdom is still 
very vague. my aim in the remainder of this section is to discuss some of 
its features as well as their implications for philosophy of religion.
3.1. Reason and understanding
First of all, wisdom is based on a much broader kind of rationality than 
the one that is predominant in modern science, including the social 
sciences; it also tends to see reality from a broader perspective. In other 
words, wisdom is the fruit of reason, whereas the scientific truth is the 
product of understanding. building on the origins of this distinction in 
the philosophies of Kant and Hegel one can say that reason is capable of 
producing ‘a self-subsistent unity, in which [...] every member exists for 
every other, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can safely be 
15 Andreas Speer, ‘Weisheit’, in Joachim ritter, Karlfried Gründer und Gottfried Gabriel 
(Hrsg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 12 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
buchgesellschaft, 2004), p. 371.
16 Andreas Speer, ‘Weisheit’, p. 371.
17 Plato, Apology 20 d-e
18 Willi oelmüller, ‘Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen’, in Willi oelmüller (hrsg.), 
Philosophie und Weisheit. Kolloquien zur Gegenwartsphilosophie, band 12. (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1989), p. 179.
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taken in any one relation, unless it has been investigated in the entirety 
of its relations to the whole employment of pure reason’.19 In Hegel’s 
philosophy, this unifying and integrating function of reason is extended 
to all domains of being. Whereas he defines understanding as ‘the capacity 
to set limits’20 and hence to produce all kinds of dichotomies, ‘the sole 
interest of reason is to suspend such rigid antitheses’.21 obviously, it is 
not Hegel’s intention to play off reason and understanding against each 
other: on the contrary, in order to avoid a kind of vague, undifferentiated 
knowledge or to remain entangled in the irrationality of immediate 
intuitions and edifying talk it is essential to start with the definitions and 
distinctions of understanding.22
When we apply this distinction to the existential approach of religious 
truth, as exemplified in traditions of wisdom, it is obvious that wisdom 
rather belongs to the domain of reason than to that of understanding. 
Wisdom does not compete with scientific rationality, but asks for the 
significance of the latter’s results for human existence. This insight puts 
the contemporary debate between science and religion in a completely 
different perspective: the Christian belief that God is the creator of 
heaven and earth does not present an alternative to the big-bang theory, 
but encourages people to believe that our life-world is a place of justice, 
that this justice is not a human invention or construction, but is willed 
by God, thus inspiring people to cooperate in fulfilling the ultimate 
goal of His creation. obviously, philosophy of religion as a reasonable 
endeavour has to examine whether this expression of religious wisdom 
is true. It has to ask why one should refer to a  divine kind of justice 
in the first place instead of relying solely on the justice of established 
human laws, if the appeal to a transcendent authority does not pave the 
way for new forms of dogmatism, and if the connection between justice 
and an all-embracing purposiveness does not lead to totalitarianism, 
thereby excluding people with other religious or secular convictions. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, b XXIII.
20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ‘Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen 
Systems der Philosophie’, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Band 4: 
Jenaer kritische Schriften (Hamburg: meiner Verlag, 1968), p. 12.
21 Ibid., p. 13.
22 Cf. Hegel’s famous metaphor in which he criticizes the result of this kind of 
knowledge as the night in which all cows are black. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 
Band 9: Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: meiner Verlag, 1980), p. 17.
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All these questions are existential ones, related to religion’s pretension 
to be a  source of true wisdom. In order to be able to answer them it 
is imperative that philosophy of religion accommodates its approach 
to the reasonable kind of rationality that is characteristic of wisdom. 
only then it can find out if the Christian faith in creation succeeds in 
giving a truthful orientation to human existence, in other words if it can 
legitimately claim to offer true wisdom. Anyhow, it is clear that, since 
religious wisdom and its philosophical examination refer to the whole of 
human existence as an integrated unity, they are founded on reason and 
reach far beyond the scope of understanding and scientific rationality.
In a similar vein, redefining religious truth in an existential way and 
examining its claim to true wisdom philosophically gives a new input to 
the hotly debated issue if and how religious insights and doctrines can be 
introduced in the public debate, and if and how they can be translated into 
a language that can in principle be understood by contemporary, secular 
society. According to rawls, ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
religious and nonreligious, may be introduced in the public political 
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political 
reasons – and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines – are 
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines introduced are said to support’.23 In this context, I am not so 
much interested in discussing ‘when’ or ‘by whom’ rawls’s famous proviso 
is to be satisfied, nor whether it puts unequal burdens on the shoulders 
of religious citizens in comparison to secular ones. Instead, I  want to 
focus on the question of what kind of public reasons are required for 
the political debate and if they are indeed reasonable. rawls summarizes 
them as ‘a  family of reasonable political conceptions of justice’, meant 
to make religious views acceptable to a  broader audience.24 but it is 
highly questionable if, in the current climate of a growing dominance 
of scientific rationality over all sectors of the life-world, rawls’s proposal 
can avoid the risk that religions are forced to comply with the standards 
of scientific rationality in order to be accepted by a broader audience, 
which would exclude a  fair discussion about their acceptability as 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. moreover, this risk not only applies 
to religions, but also to secular traditions of wisdom. In my  view rawls 
23 John rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded edition (New York: Columbia university 
Press, 2005), p. 462.
24 Ibid., p. 463.
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underestimates the disenchanting and distorting effects of scientific 
rationality on religious as well as secular ways of life. When put in this 
situation, people who consider these traditions as sources of wisdom 
feel disrespected and not taken seriously, since they are forced to justify 
themselves before a tribunal that is biased, because it is based on a kind 
of rationality that is completely at odds with the existential truth that 
these traditions express. one only needs to refer to the tendency of 
scientific rationality to ‘naturalise’ human existence, which makes it 
almost impossible for these traditions of wisdom to reasonably argue 
what it means to see humans primarily as persons.
In sum, the distinction between understanding and reason may prove 
to be helpful to enable religions and secular world-views presenting 
themselves not as irrational ways of life, but as expressions of wisdom, 
claiming to give a  truthful orientation to human life. obviously, 
philosophy of religion has to examine whether these claims are legitimate, 
but without laying them on the Procrustean bed of scientific rationality. 
rather, it interprets them as reasonable, i.e. as offering an integral 
perspective on human existence, thereby enabling these traditions to 
be discussed on their own terms. Finally, approaching religions and 
secular world-views as expressions of wisdom provides them with 
a  common ground, which is essential to prevent reasonable pluralism 
from degenerating into its arbitrary, postmodern variant.25
3.2. Particularity and universality
Secondly, defining religious traditions as (particular) ways of life 
that claim to express (universal) wisdom requires reconsidering the 
conception of the relation between these two concepts. Trying to make 
sense of religious truth in a context of radical plurality presupposes first 
of all that one refrains from lumping together all these expressions of 
(religious) wisdom as equally contextual and hence particular without 
any discrimination as to the legitimacy of their respective truth-claims. 
Apart from the fact that such an approach is philosophically very 
dissatisfying it fails to contribute in a  meaningful way to the current 
debate of the role of religion in the public sphere. but on the other hand, 
the approach of traditional metaphysics, including theism, consisting in 
laying bare the universal, theoretical truth-claims of religions and secular 
25 rawls too distinguishes between reasonable pluralism and pluralism as such. See: 
John rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded edition, pp. 36-7.
151reDeFINING relIGIouS TruTH
world-views by abstracting as much as possible from the particularity 
and contingency in which they are embedded, does not work either. As 
we have seen above, this approach has contributed largely to theism’s loss 
of plausibility. Hence it is a major challenge for philosophy of religion to 
try out an alternative approach of the relationship between particularity 
and universality. This could lie in developing a  kind of metaphysics, 
which starts hermeneutically, that is from the recognition that religions 
and secular world-views are primarily concrete ways of life, embedded 
in the particular history of (religious) communities. but as metaphysics 
it remains loyal to the idea of religious truth, trying to approximate it 
by critically examining how these traditions respond to the perennial 
questions about the origin and destiny of humankind. To give only one 
historic example of this approach among many others: in his moral 
philosophy F.H. Jacobi sets out to depart from concrete life-stories, in 
which persons do not so much demonstrate, but rather testify to the 
truth of their basic beliefs, thereby criticising the abstract universality 
and the impersonal character of Kant’s moral philosophy.26
How does this hermeneutical metaphysics deal with the relation 
between particularity and universality in connection to religious truth? 
In accordance with the nature of this approach, let us start with a concrete 
example of Christian wisdom, viz. the prayer for forgiveness in the our 
Father: ‘Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.’27 
The question then is if this particular expression of wisdom relates to 
existential truth, and hence can legitimately claim (a certain degree of) 
universality. The existential truth of the prayer for forgiveness lies in the 
fact that it links the horizontal moral obligation to forgive one’s debtor 
to a vertical dimension, the beneficial experience that humans, however 
sinful they may be, can trust on the promise that God forgives their 
debts against him, which are infinitely greater. This inspires Christians 
to go as far as to forgive the unforgivable. According to a contemporary 
secular philosopher as Derrida, this is basically what forgiveness is all 
about: a  pure gift without the guarantee of a  return. In other words, 
the basic experience that our sinful existence is mercifully accepted by 
God makes it legitimate that he demands from us, not to forgive our 
brothers and sisters seven times, ‘but seventy times seven times’, that 
26 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Werke. Gesamtausgabe, Band 1: Schriften zum 
Spinozastreit (Hamburg: meiner Verlag, 1998), pp. 131-2.
27 matthew 6:12.
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is to forgive infinitely.28 Thus, the existential truth of this expression of 
Christian wisdom lies in the fundamental anthropological insight that 
the vertical dimension of forgiveness (the experience of God’s mercy) 
may be essential for humans to be able to forgive even the unforgiveable 
or to forgive infinitely (the horizontal dimension). This is not to say that 
only Christians are able to forgive, but points to the universal meaning 
of a particular tradition.
In a  similar vein Habermas has argued that particular religious 
traditions often express normative truths, in which a secular society can 
recognise universal moral intuitions, with which it has lost contact in the 
course of time. He illustrates this by means of the biblical story of God’s 
creation of man: ‘God created man in his own image; in his own image 
He created him.’29 This religious belief expresses the idea that God, as 
a God of love, created Adam and eve as free beings, similar to, but at the 
same time absolutely different from Him: ‘God remains a “God of free 
men” only as long as we do not level out the absolute difference that exists 
between the creator and the creature.’30 Habermas takes this particular 
religious insight to express a fundamental normative truth, the dignity 
of every human being, and uses it to criticise the social and moral effects 
of gen-technology. When this technology is applied to humans, it indeed 
erases this difference between creator and creation, thus entailing fatal 
consequences for humanity as such:
one need not believe in theological premises in order to understand what 
follows from this, namely, that an entirely different kind of dependence, 
perceived as a causal one, becomes involved if the difference [between 
God and man] assumed as inherent in the concept of creation were to 
disappear and the place of God be taken by a peer – if, that is, a human 
being would intervene, according to his own preferences and without 
being justified in assuming, at least counterfactually, a  consent of the 
concerned other, in the random combinations of the parents’ sets of 
chromosomes. [...] Would not the first human being to determine, at his 
own discretion, the natural essence of another human being at the same 
time destroy the equal freedoms that exist among persons of equal birth 
in order to ensure their difference?31
28 matthew 18:21.
29 Genesis 1:27.
30 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, in Idem, The Future of Human Nature 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 114-5.
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In my view both the above examples are illustrations of a promising 
approach of the relation between the particularity of religious traditions 
and their claim to express true wisdom. Apparently, religious wisdom not 
only orientates the lives of the members of a specific religious community, 
but can also have a fundamental significance for other people, including 
secular ones. Far from suggesting that this approach solves all problems 
regarding religious truth in the context of a radical plurality of religions 
and secular world-views, it at least enables the latter to participate in 
the public debate without being marginalised a  priori as a  particular, 
biased position. This gives an interesting twist to the statement that 
contemporary society is post-secular: it is not only post-secular because 
religion, as a matter of fact, has not disappeared from the public scene, but 
also because particular religious traditions are the bearers of fundamental 
moral intuitions, which otherwise could be lost:31‘Philosophy has good 
reasons to be willing to learn from religious traditions.’32
3.3. Wisdom and truth
A  final and perhaps most fundamental aspect of the suggestion to 
redefine the idea of religious truth in an existential way concerns the 
question of how exactly it is related to (religious) traditions as expressions 
of wisdom. As already pointed out above, Plato defined philosophy as 
a  critical examination of the truth of wisdom, a  definition which has 
become paradigmatic. However, since the rise of science and its impact 
on philosophy the latter’s relation to wisdom has changed dramatically. 
Since then philosophy’s only remaining option to examine the truth 
of wisdom has been to apply the critical and methodological rigor of 
science. The conclusion of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason offers an 
excellent illustration of this shift:
Science (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow 
gate that leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom [...]. Philosophy 
must always continue to be the guardian of this science; and although the 
public does not take any interest in its subtle investigations, it must take 
an interest in the resulting doctrines, which such an examination first 
puts in a clear light.33
31 Ibid., p. 115.
32 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional 
State’, in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On 
Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p. 42.
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Although33some contemporary philosophers agree with Kant’s thesis 
that science is the indispensable ‘organon’ for philosophy in order to be 
able to separate true wisdom from fanaticism (‘Schwärmerei’),34 I have 
shown above that the type of rationality that predominates science is too 
restricted to be able to critically account for the truth-claims of wisdom.
Instead of following Kant’s suggestion to use science to pass a massive 
and final judgment about the truth of wisdom I want to take another 
approach and focus on the life-orientating character of wisdom. The 
advantage of this approach is that it explicitly links wisdom to the 
concrete existence of humans, thereby accepting that there is a plurality 
of ways to give orientation to one’s life, but at the same rejecting the 
idea that every orientation is all the same, in other words that there 
would be no qualitative differences between various traditions of 
wisdom, and that one could not argue reasonably about their truth. 
In order to develop the idea of a reasonable discussion concerning the 
truth of various life-orientations I  want to start from a  text of Kant’s 
in which he explicitly addresses this issue, viz. What Does It Mean: to 
Orientate Oneself In Thinking?.35 Kant wrote this essay as a  reaction 
to the pantheism-controversy of 1785, opposing mendelssohn, the 
most illustrious representative of the German enlightenment, and 
Jacobi, who was generally seen as defending the position that truth is 
the result of immediate revelation. It is not my intention here to offer 
a detailed historical account of the ins and outs of this controversy and 
Kant’s position in it, but to examine from a systematic perspective how 
he answers the question of how one can orientate oneself truthfully in 
moral matters.36
33 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, in Immanuel Kant, Werke in 
zehn Bänden, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Band 6: Schriften zur Ethik und 
Religionsphilosophie: Erster Teil (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft, 1968), 
p. 302. See also: Immanuel Kant, ‘logik’, in Immanuel Kant, Werke in zehn Bänden. Band 5: 
Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, p. 449: ‘For science is of an intrinsic value as an organon 
of wisdom only. but, as such, it is indispensable to it; so that it may well be maintained that 
wisdom without science is a shadow of a perfection which we never shall reach.’
34 ludger Honnefelder, ‘Weisheit durch den Weg der Wissenschaft. Theologie 
und Philosophie bei Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin’, in Willi oelmüller (hrsg.), 
Philosophie und Weisheit: Kolloquien zur Gegenwartsphilosophie, Band 12 (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1989), p. 77; Willi oelmüller, ‘Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen’, in 
Willie oelmüller (hrsg.), Philosophie und Weisheit, pp. 174-177.
35 Immanuel Kant, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?’ in Immanuel Kant, Werke 
in zehn Bänden. Band 5: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, pp. 267-283.
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In36his search for a principle that could orientate us in (our thinking 
about) moral matters Kant agrees neither with mendelssohn nor with 
Jacobi: common sense is unable to guide us in moral matters, since 
it is too ambivalent (against mendelssohn), but renouncing reason 
completely by relying on an ‘effusive intuition under the name of faith 
to which tradition or revelation can be grafted on without the consent 
of reason’,37 as Jacobi did, is even more problematic, since it only leads to 
fanaticism. on the contrary, being able to reasonably examine the truth 
of one’s orientation in life is an essential and necessary human capacity. 
So he calls on everyone to ‘accept whatever seems most credible to 
you after careful and honest examination [...]; but do not deny reason 
that prerogative which makes it the greatest good on earth, namely 
its right to be the ultimate touchstone of truth’.38 However, the kind of 
reason that Kant has in mind is not the pre-critical, dogmatic reason 
of the enlightenment-philosophers (including mendelssohn), which 
claimed to possess an objective, quasi scientific knowledge of truth in 
moral issues; herewith he rules out a theistic answer right from the start. 
Instead of the two aforementioned extremes Kant suggests that ‘the 
extended and more precisely defined concept of orientating oneself can 
be helpful to elucidate the maxim of healthy reason in its activities to 
attain cognition of super-sensible objects’.39
Kant’s argument about orientating oneself in thinking is especially 
relevant for the current debate because he accepts the reality of (religious) 
pluralism: orientation is always linked to the specific, subjective position 
of a person or a community in a given moral landscape. but at the same 
time he holds on to humanity’s fundamental need to reasonably examine 
the truth of their life-orientations, thereby admitting that they are not 
all the same. moreover the concept of orientating oneself in thinking 
qualifies in a most interesting way what it means to reason about moral 
issues in concrete, lifelike situations. Although the content of the idea of 
moral orientation will be developed in the next paragraphs, it is already 
clear at this stage that every orientation, because of the subjective aspect 
it involves, differs from the conviction that the objective truth of one’s 
faith is guaranteed, because it is the result of an immediate inspiration 
36 For an historical analysis of this essay cf. Gerd Irrlitz, Kant-Handbuch. Leben und 
Werk (Stuttgart: metzler, 2002), pp. 419-422.
37 Immanuel Kant, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?’, p. 268.
38 Ibid., p. 283.
39 Ibid., pp. 268-9.
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of the divine, as well as from the position that claims to be able to 
demonstrate the truth of life-orientations with the help of a completely 
disengaged, so to speak, scientific rationality. reasoning about the truth 
of one’s life-orientation is fine and even necessary, but has to depart from 
the existential situation one finds oneself in.
every kind of orientation requires a subjective principle: if one wants 
to orientate oneself geographically, the awareness of the difference 
between one’s left and right hand is essential to find out, when one 
knows that it is midday, where the sun has risen. by analogy, to orientate 
oneself in thinking means ‘to be guided, in one’s conviction of truth, by 
a subjective principle of reason where objective principles of reason are 
inadequate’.40 Such a  guidance is especially necessary in existential or 
moral situations, because we feel on the one hand an urgent (subjective) 
need to pass a true judgment about our life-orientations, while on the 
other we are painfully aware of the lack of objective knowledge that 
would make such a judgment univocally and universally true. In other 
words, to orientate oneself in moral questions is neither a matter of just 
doing whatever come to one’s mind, nor of objective science. Therefore, 
just as in a geographical orientation we then need an orienting principle, 
in the light of which a  judgment can be passed. but characteristic for 
an orientation in thinking is that this principle is not a  sensuous one, 
but is inherent in reason itself. obviously philosophy has to examine 
critically if this principle is not contradictory and if it, as a supersensible 
principle, can suitably be related to our reasoning about the experienced 
world. So, whenever we orientate ourselves in thinking ‘the right of the 
need of reason supervenes as a subjective ground for presupposing and 
accepting something which reason cannot presume to know on objective 
grounds, and hence for orientating ourselves in thinking [...] purely by 
means of the need of reason alone’.41
As said, the need of this subjective guiding principle is above all pressing 
in moral or existential matters; that is, whenever we are confronted with 
the necessity to judge about e.g. the possibility of reconciling virtue and 
happiness, freedom and nature. According to Kant this need can only 
be fulfilled by accepting the objective reality of an original archetypical 
being, both as the supreme intelligence and the highest good. Although 
the existence of this being cannot be demonstrated objectively, its 
40 Immanuel Kant, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?’, p. 270, footnote.
41 Ibid., p. 271.
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acceptance is nevertheless essential in order to prevent the highest good 
as well as morality as a whole from being regarded merely as an ideal. 
Kant calls this attitude a reasonable belief; it consists in the subjective 
conviction of the truth of a being on purely reasonable grounds, while 
at the same time being aware that the existence of this being cannot be 
demonstrated objectively. This reasonable belief is a conviction of truth 
which is subjectively adequate, but objectively inadequate. It thus holds 
an intermediary position between an opinion (which is a  subjectively 
and objectively inadequate conviction of truth) and knowledge (which is 
a conviction of truth on subjectively and objectively adequate grounds). 
Thus, ‘a pure faith of reason is the signpost of a compass by means of 
which the speculative thinker can orientate himself on his reasonable 
wanderings in the field of supersensible objects’.42
Kant’s analysis of orientating oneself in thinking offers a fascinating 
elucidation of religion and secular world-views as traditional forms of 
wisdom and their relation to truth. First of all, the subjective character of 
the need for wisdom does not mean that every individual could invent 
or construct it high-handedly, but that it is a basic characteristic of all 
humans: we have a fundamental need for wisdom, because knowing how 
to orientate ourselves is essential in all moral, i.e. existential, matters. 
because this need is so deeply embedded in our spiritual nature, it 
is subjectively adequate. In my view this insight in the ‘subjective 
universality’ of the need for wisdom offers the common ground in order 
to understand the basic anthropological dynamic of religions and secular 
world-views. The debate between religions and secular world-views it 
not between irrational faith and objective reason, but between diverging 
traditions of wisdom, each of them offering its own way to orientate 
one’s life. However, the subjective universality of the need for wisdom 
does not by itself mean that the objective counterpart of this need is 
demonstrably true. In this respect Kant says that the best we can reach is 
a reasonable faith in the reality of the highest good, which is exemplified 
in the highest being. This being serves as the point of reference, with the 
help of which we judge the existential truth of our concrete orientations 
in life. but because of its objective inadequacy it can never serve as 
a standard that is always at our disposal and can be read unambiguously. 
Furthermore, from a contemporary perspective it is clear that the object 
of the pure faith of reason cannot be identified with God as supreme 
42 Ibid., p. 277.
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intelligence and highest good, as Kant does, since this would rule out 
secular forms of wisdom a priori. Instead I want to suggest the idea of 
human dignity as constituting the substance of this subjective principle, 
since it unites secular as well as religious traditions. It is essential to stress 
the objective inadequacy of the idea of human dignity, implying that it 
cannot be identified with the (rather Western and secular) declaration 
of human rights, but remains open to approaches from various religious 
and secular, Western and non-Western traditions.
Anyhow, the gap between subjective adequacy and objective 
inadequacy is essential for all kinds of human wisdom, religious and 
secular, as it is a consequence of the fact that we are finite beings, lacking 
a divine knowledge of the world in which we live. but although the truth 
of human wisdom cannot be demonstrated unambiguously, a reasonable 
examination of it is nevertheless essential, since from our own experience 
we know that there are orientations in life that lead us astray. As said 
above, the basic reason for this approach is that reason and not some 
divine illumination is the ultimate touchstone of truth.
Following the terminology of the second section of this paper one can 
call this combination of subjective adequacy and objective inadequacy 
the plausibility of religion, since plausibility concerns the reasonable 
acceptability (as distinct from the demonstrable truth) of religion for 
a subject or community. In sum, as I argued above philosophy of religion 
should focus on a reasonable argumentation in favour of the plausibility 
of religion, thereby starting from the common insight that religious and 
secular ways of life are attempts to orientate people in existential questions.
CoNCluSIoN
If philosophers of religion want to try the existential approach to 
religious truth presented in the previous section, they first of all need to 
be familiar with what a religious way of life means, just like philosophers 
of art are required to have some familiarity with art. by accepting this 
condition, they somehow continue the pre-modern tradition of faithful 
thinking, of faith searching for understanding, albeit in a totally different 
context than the one of Anselm, who was one of its founding fathers. This 
difference primarily concerns the dominance of secular ways of life and 
the growing presence of non-Christian religious traditions. They make 
the position of contemporary religious philosophers look similar to the 
one of the apostle Paul on the Areopagus. Just as Paul had to explain the 
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truth of the Christian way of life to epicurean and stoic philosophers, 
who did not at all share his basic convictions, the task of contemporary 
philosophers of religion is also to explain the substantially true in the 
religious way of life they are familiar with, as reasonably as possible, so 
that it is also intelligible to people not sharing it.
